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INTRODUCTION
It is characteristic of the Anglo-American legal tradition that it
locates the Golden Age not in the future but in the past. In 1100, King
Henry I promised in his coronation charter to restore the good
customs as they were in the days of King Edward the Confessor,
before the Norman Conquest.2 In 1215 Henry II’s son, King John,
acting under duress, sealed Magna Carta, restoring ancient liberties.3
Three centuries later, Sir Edward Coke combated the absolutist
claims of King James I with appeals to ancient learning found in old
books, things whereof the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary, and gave particular prominence to the rediscovered—in fact
reinvented—Magna Carta.4 In the eighteenth century, Americans saw
themselves reenacting Coke’s challenge to Stuart absolutism as they
* © 2016 John V. Orth.
1. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 119 (1951).
2. Coronation Charter of Henry I, translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF
LAW, 379 app. A (Daniel Barstow Magraw et al. eds., 2014); see JUDITH A. GREEN, THE
GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND UNDER HENRY I, at 98 (1986).
3. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 172 (2d ed. 1898) (“On the whole,
the charter contains little that is absolutely new. It is restorative.”).
4. See MAURICE ASHLEY, MAGNA CARTA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 10–13
(1965); HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE ENGLISHMAN AND HIS HISTORY 55 (Ernest
Barker ed., 1945).
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defied King George III.5 After Independence, Thomas Jefferson
proposed to base the laws of Virginia on English common law as it
was before the “oldest statutes extant,” that is, even before Magna
Carta.6 But, of course, it was never possible to go back to the “good
old days” of Anglo-Saxon England or to the ancient constitution of
Sir Edward Coke. Nor did anyone really want to. It was an idealized
past, a past that never was that they wanted to revivify or, rather,
vivify. A tradition that claims to be ruled by the past cannot rest
content with the past as it was. The past must somehow be made to do
the work of the present.
The tension between the past as past and an imagined past that is
used to justify a desired present inevitably creates tensions between
historians committed to the Rankean ideal of telling it wie es
eigentlich gewesen, as it really was,7 and the assorted reformers,
revolutionaries, and legal theorists who claim to want to turn back the
clock. This tension was evident from the beginning. Tories and
royalists dismissed Magna Carta as a feudal irrelevance: the
seventeenth-century scholar Robert Brady was a better historian than
Coke.8 But who ever heard of Robert Brady?
It is now a commonplace that there are two Magna Cartas, the
medieval “big charter”—big as opposed to the little Carta de
Foresta9—and the reimagined Great Charter of Liberties of Sir
Edward Coke.10 In fact, there is at least one more: the Magna Carta
that Americans gleaned from the pages of Blackstone’s

5. See JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE,
HOBBES, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 11–47 (1992); David N.
Mayer, The English Radical Whig Origins of American Constitutionalism, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 131, 174–96 (1992).
6. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 137 (William Peden
ed., 1955) (1785).
7. Leopold von Ranke, Preface: Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations from
1494–1514, in THE VARIETIES OF HISTORY: FROM VOLTAIRE TO THE PRESENT 55, 57
(Fritz Stern ed., 1956).
8. See HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, MAGNA CARTA IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE
SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 23 (1969) (“Brady . . . stands for the principle
with which we are so familiar at the present day—namely, that a document like the
Charter has to be interpreted according to the form and structure of the society in which it
had its origin.”); see also J. C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 36 (George Garnett & John Hudson
eds., 3d ed. 2015); J. G. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL
LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
182–228 (1967).
9. See W. L. WARREN, KING JOHN 237 n. (1961).
10. Wm. S. McKechnie, Magna Carta (1215–1915), in MAGNA CARTA
COMMEMORATION ESSAYS 1, 12 (Henry Elliott Malden ed., 1917).
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Commentaries.11 Even the most ardent defenders of England’s
chartered liberties recognized that many, even most, of the chapters
of Magna Carta were ancient history in the negative sense, irrelevant
centuries later. The feudal incident of relief upon inheritance, limited
by chapters two and three (1215),12 went out with the Statute of
Tenures (1660).13 And the grasping kinsmen of Gerard de Athyes,
deprived of their offices by chapter fifty (1215),14 became food for
worms long ago.
I. MAGNA CARTA IN NORTH CAROLINA: THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY
But a handful of the chapters from the original could still be put
to use in the present—most obviously, the famous legem terrae or law
of the land clause, chapter thirty-nine of the original, chapter twentynine of the 1225 edition and subsequent codification.15 Determined to
consolidate their victory over tyranny, many American
revolutionaries promptly incorporated this clause in their state
constitutions.16 In the North Carolina Declaration of Rights of 1776,
an edited version modeled on the Maryland Declaration of Rights
drafted earlier that year17 appears in section twelve: “[N]o freeman
ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties,
or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or
deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.”18
Carried forward in the state’s 1868 constitution19 and again in the
1971 revision,20 it is now often thought of as North Carolina’s version
11. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *127–28. G. Alan Tarr refers to the
three “faces” of Magna Carta: “an historical face, a legal face, and a symbolic face.” G.
Alan Tarr, American State Constitutions and the Three Faces of Magna Carta, in MAGNA
CARTA: MUSE AND MENTOR 122, 122 (Randy J. Holland ed., 2014).
12. MAGNA CARTA chs. 2, 3 (1215), reprinted and translated in DAVID CARPENTER,
MAGNA CARTA 38–39 (2015).
13. 12 Car. 2, c. 24 (1660).
14. MAGNA CARTA ch. 50 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note
12, at 56–57.
15. MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note
12, at 52–53; MAGNA CARTA ch. 29 (1225), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE
OF LAW, supra note 2, at 429.
16. E.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 21.
17. Id.
18. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 12.
19. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 17. The 1868 Constitution carried forward the
provision in the 1776 Constitution verbatim, renumbering the section and relabeling the
Declaration of Rights as Article I.
20. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 (substituting “shall” for “ought”). The mandatory nature
of the provisions of the original Declaration of Rights had long been recognized. See, e.g.,
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of the Federal Due Process Clause,21 although in fact it would be
more accurate to think of the Federal Due Process Clause22—also
derived from the same chapter of Magna Carta by way of a Law
French translation23—as the federal version of North Carolina’s law
of the land clause.
Although the law of the land clause was the only bit of Magna
Carta copied more or less directly into the state’s first constitution,
the North Carolina drafters undoubtedly thought they had
incorporated much more. Habeas corpus and trial by jury were then
often fathered on Magna Carta.24 And years later, when knowledge of
the 1215 original revealed what had dropped out of the reissues, the
source of the ban on taxation without representation was located in

Smith v. Campbell, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 590, 598 (1825) (“[T]he word ought, in this and
other sections of the [Constitution,] should be understood imperatively. It is sufficient for
the creature to know the will of the creator. Obedience is then a duty, without an express
command.”). For a brief discussion of the insignificance of the changed wording, see John
V. Orth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 203, 205–06 (1993) (reviewing TOWARD A USABLE PAST:
LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds.,
1991)). Also in 1971, an additional sentence guaranteeing equal protection of the laws was
added. N.C. CONST. art I, § 19; see JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL MARTIN NEWBY, THE NORTH
CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 68 (2d ed. 2013).
21. See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 254 N.C. 301, 303, 118 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1961); Nat’l Sur.
Corp. v. Sharpe, 232 N.C. 98, 103, 59 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1950); Yancey v. N.C. State Highway
& Pub. Works Comm’n, 222 N.C. 106, 108, 22 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1942); Johnston v. State,
224 N.C. App. 282, 296, 735 S.E.2d 859, 870 (2012), aff’d per curiam, 367 N.C. 164, 749
S.E.2d 278 (2013).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
23. See 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 59–63 (7th ed.
1956).
24. As to habeas corpus, see, for example, In re Bryan, 60 N.C. (Win.) 1, 15 (1863)
(citing “our Constitution and Bill of Rights, in which is reiterated the great principle of
Magna Carta, ‘every free man restrained of his liberty is entitled to a remedy to inquire
into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove the same if unlawful, and such remedy ought
not to be denied or delayed’ ”); Report of the Commissioners Appointed by an Act of the
Legislature of 1817, To Revise the Laws of North-Carolina, in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF
NORTH-CAROLINA, at iii, v (Henry Potter ed., 1821) (“[T]he immunity of the subject from
unjust imprisonment is proclaimed by magna charta . . . .”). As to trial by jury, see, for
example, Resolutions Adopted by the Provincial Congress of North Carolina (Aug. 27,
1774), in 9 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 1043, 1045 (William L.
Saunders ed., 1890) (“Resolved, That trial by Juries of the vicinity is the only lawful
inquest that can pass upon the life of a British subject and that it is a right handed down to
us from the earliest stages confirmed and sanctified by Magna Charta itself that no
freeman shall be taken and imprisoned or dispossessed of his free tenement and Liberties
or outlawed or banished or otherwise hurt or injured unless by the legal judgment of his
peers or by the law of the Land, and therefore all who suffer otherwise are not victims to
public justice but fall a sacrifice to the powers of Tyranny and highhanded oppression.”).
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the lost chapters twelve and fourteen.25 But the exact ancestry of the
rights declared in the state’s first constitution was really beside the
point. The drafters took Coke at his word that Magna Carta was “for
the most part declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental
laws of England.”26 Common law reception, beginning with a colonial
statute in 1715 and repeated after Independence with a state statute
in 1778, made further copying unnecessary.27
For sixty years after Independence, North Carolina lawyers
worried fitfully about whether any of the lesser chapters of Magna
Carta were included among the English statutes still in force in the
state. Francois-Xavier Martin in his Collection of the Statutes of the
Parliament of England in Force in the State of North-Carolina,
published in 1792 in accordance with “a resolve of the General
Assembly,” included two such lesser chapters: the chapter concerning
the security of foreign merchants and the chapter limiting appeals of
death by a woman.28 But Henry Potter’s revisal in 1821 did not

25. See JOHN MANNING, COMMENTARIES ON THE FIRST BOOK OF BLACKSTONE 27
(1899) (listing under “Rights of Private Property, Protections Afforded, Magna Charta”:
“No taxes are to be imposed without the consent of the people or their representatives”);
SAMUEL F. MORDECAI, LAW LECTURES: A TREATISE, FROM A NORTH CAROLINA
STANDPOINT, ON THOSE PORTIONS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND BOOKS OF THE
COMMENTARIES OF SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE WHICH HAVE NOT BECOME OBSOLETE
IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1916) (“[Magna Carta] is said to be the forerunner of the
control of the purse strings by parliament.”). But see A. E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA
CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 11 (rev. ed. 1998) (“This puts the argument for the
significance of chapters 12 and 14 in too strong and too modern a form. Nevertheless, it is
not hard to see that in the notion that at least some kinds of exactions could not be had
without consent there lay a ready example for those who in later ages sought ancient
precedents for the claim of the right of a people to be taxed only with their consent.”).
26. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *127–28 (citing EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *proem).
27. Act of 1778, ch. 5, reprinted in 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA
162 (Walter Clark ed., 1905); Act of 1715, ch. 31, reprinted in 23 THE STATE RECORDS OF
NORTH CAROLINA 38 (Walter Clark ed., 1905). An Act of 1749 had adopted seven
chapters from the 1225 codification of Magna Carta, including the all-important chapter
twenty-nine. Act of 1749, ch. 1, reprinted in 23 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH
CAROLINA 317 (Walter Clark ed., 1905). Although included in Swann’s Revisal, it
disappeared from later collections. See A COLLECTION OF ALL THE PUBLIC ACTS OF
ASSEMBLY, OF THE PROVINCE OF NORTH-CAROLINA: NOW IN FORCE AND USE 293–94
(Samuel Swann ed., James Davis 1751); JAMES IREDELL, LAWS OF THE STATE OF
NORTH-CAROLINA 127 n.a (Edenton, N.C., Hodge & Wills 1791) (noting that the Act of
1749 is “universally acknowledged to have been repealed or disallowed by the King in
Council”). It was traditionally believed that it was disallowed “upon the ground that it was
too sweeping in its repeal of British statutes.” MORDECAI, supra note 25, at 6–7.
28. FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF THE STATUTES OF THE
PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 1 (Newbern,
N.C., Editor’s Press 1792). Compare MAGNA CARTA chs. 30, 34 (1225), translated in
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include either of these (or any other) chapters of Magna Carta.29 Only
in 1838 was the problem definitively resolved. The Revised Statutes,
enacted by the general assembly and published in that year, repealed
whatever English statutes were still in force, with certain exceptions.30
When authorizing the preparation of the Revised Statutes, the
general assembly directed the superintendents, James Iredell and
William Battle, to include certain historical documents as well: “the
second charter of Charles the Second to the lords proprietors of this
State, the great deed of grant from the lords proprietors, the grant
from George the Second to the Earl of Granville”—essentially the
title deeds to the state—and “such other acts, now in force, and not
repealed by this act, as the superintendents may in their discretion
think proper.”31 Interpreting their mandate broadly, Iredell and
Battle included both the “Magna Carta of King John” and the
“Magna Carta of Edward I.”32 And for good measure, they added the
Petition of Rights (reaffirming relevant parts of Magna Carta) and
other similar documents.33 The immediate source may have been an
identical collection in South Carolina’s revisal of a year earlier;34 in
both, King John’s Magna Carta is divided into seventy-nine chapters,
rather than the now familiar sixty-three35—incidentally making the
citation of Magna Carta, already confused by the multiple reissues,
even more complicated.36 The South Carolinians credited Sir William

MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 2, at 430, with MAGNA CARTA chs.
41, 54 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note 12, at 52–53, 58–59.
29. 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA, supra note 24, at 85–93. Although
the general assembly charged Henry Potter, J. L. Taylor, and Bart. Yancey with preparing
the revisal, Potter was the one who supervised the publication and whose name is attached
to the revisal in the official statutory history in the North Carolina General Statutes. Id.
30. See 1 N.C. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2 (1837).
31. Id. § 10. Frederick Nash had been authorized by the general assembly, along with
Iredell and Battle, to prepare the revised statutes, but only Iredell and Battle supervised
the publication, which is referred to in the official statutory history in the North Carolina
General Statutes as Revised Statutes. Id.
32. 2 N.C. REV. STAT. 480–500 (1837).
33. Id. at 501–09. The copy of the Revised Statutes in the collection of Martin
Brinkley, Dean of the University of North Carolina School of Law, is inscribed with
marginalia by Thomas Ruffin.
34. 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 72–77 (Thomas Cooper ed.,
Columbia, S.C., A. S. Johnston 1836).
35. Compare 2 N.C. REV. STAT. 480–92 (1837), and 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 34, at 75–77, with MAGNA CARTA chs. 1–63 (1215),
reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note 12, at 36–69.
36. E.g., Rose v. City of Rocky Mount, 184 N.C. 609, 610, 113 S.E. 506, 507 (1922)
(citing “chapter 47” on the prompt administration of justice). In the conventional division
of Magna Carta of 1215 this chapter would be numbered forty, but in the 1225 reissue it
would be chapter twenty-nine. Compare MAGNA CARTA ch. 40 (1215), reprinted and
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Blackstone’s Law Tracts for the Latin text—included in the South
Carolina, but not the North Carolina compilation—and the English
translation of Magna Carta by Nicolas Tindal and Tobias Smollett in
Paul Rapin de Thoyras’s Histoire d’Angleterre.37
The renewed interest that Carolinians showed in the historical
documents may have been more than mere scholarly zeal; it came at a
time of growing sectional conflict. Nat Turner’s rebellion in Virginia
in 1831 had given new urgency to the national debate about slavery.38
The union had barely survived the South Carolina Nullification Crisis
the following year.39 And the abolitionist campaign had begun to
rattle North Carolinian nerves.40 Governor David Swain used his 1835
address to the general assembly to denounce the recent “spirit of
fanaticism.”41 Southerners may have looked to Magna Carta’s
centuries-old guarantee of free men’s property to defend slavery—the
region’s “peculiar institution.”42 Eventually, Chief Justice Roger
Taney would hold in the notorious Dred Scott case43 that the federal

translated in CARPENTER, supra note 12, at 52–53, with MAGNA CARTA ch. 29 (1225),
translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 2, at 429.
37. 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 34, at 73 (“The
Charter of King John, I have taken from Blackstone’s Law-tracts, compared with the
edition in the Stat. of the Realm. The translation I have adopted from Rapin’s Hist. of
England.”); see 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, LAW TRACTS 15–37 (Oxford, Clarendon Press
1762); 1 RAPIN DE THOYRAS, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 261 (N. Tindal & T. Smollett eds. &
trans., London, John Harrison 1789) (1724) (citing the Cotton Library as the source of the
Latin text). The copy of Blackstone’s Law Tracts in the collection of the Kathrine R.
Everett Law Library of the University of North Carolina is inscribed by William Hooper,
a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and dated in 1765 in Hooper’s handwriting.
38. See generally NAT TURNER 1–12 (Eric Foner ed., 1971) (analyzing contemporary
understandings and historical accounts of Nat Turner’s slave rebellion).
39. See generally WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE
NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816–1836, at ix–3 (1965)
(providing an in-depth chronicle of events and discussion of the crisis of 1832–1833).
40. See LACY K. FORD, DELIVER US FROM EVIL: THE SLAVERY QUESTION IN THE
OLD SOUTH 494 (2009).
41. DAVID L. SWAIN, MESSAGE OF THE GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE, AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SESSION,
NOVEMBER 16, 1835, at 6 (1835); see FORD, supra note 40, at 494.
42. KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (Vintage Books ed. 1956). The only other state to include Magna Carta
in its statute books during the antebellum period was Georgia in 1845. Northern states
followed after the Civil War. For a complete list of states that included Magna Carta in
their statute books, see Joyce Lee Malcolm, Magna Carta in America: Entrenched, in
MAGNA CARTA: THE FOUNDATION OF FREEDOM 1215–2015, at 120, 132 (Nicholas
Vincent ed., 2d ed. 2015).
43. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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guarantee of due process protected a slave owner’s property—a
precocious example of substantive due process.44
After the Civil War, North Carolina caught up with other states
and included in the Reconstruction Constitution of 1868 a clause
inspired by another chapter of Magna Carta: the open courts clause.
This clause, elaborated from chapter forty (1215),45 chapter twenty of
the 1225 edition46 and subsequent codification, provided the
following: “All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial, or delay.”47
From early days, North Carolina judges cited chapters of Magna
Carta but not always the obvious ones. In a 1795 case concerning the
nice point of whether a bond sealed but not subscribed by the
witnesses could be declared upon in an action of debt or whether only
covenant lay, Judge Haywood noted that archbishops, bishops, and
barons attested Magna Carta by their seals, not by their signatures.48
Other unusual cases sometimes reminded learned jurists of obsolete
chapters of Magna Carta. For instance, the case of a guardian who
permitted his underage female ward to marry the guardian’s
impecunious son led Justice Gaston to mention the nondisparagement
chapter.49 A claim of an exclusive right to fish in navigable waters
reminded Chief Justice Ruffin of the chapter concerning fish weirs.50
A bequest to Davidson College that would have caused the college’s
assets to exceed the maximum allowed by its charter reminded Chief
Justice Nash of the mortmain chapter in the reissue of 1225.51 And a
personal injury action brought by an Austro-Hungarian father on
behalf of his minor son, which was caught up in the outbreak of

44. Id. at 450 (“[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of
his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a
particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the
laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.”).
45. MAGNA CARTA ch. 40 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note
12, at 52–53.
46. MAGNA CARTA ch. 20 (1225), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF
LAW, supra note 2, at 428.
47. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 35; see N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18.
48. Ingram v. Hall, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 193, 204 (Super. Ct. 1795).
49. Shutt v. Carloss, 36 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 232, 240 (1838) (referring to MAGNA
CARTA ch. 6 (1215)).
50. Collins v. Benbury, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 118, 126 (1844) (referring to MAGNA CARTA
ch. 33 (1215)).
51. Trs. of Davidson Coll. v. Ex rel. Chambers, 56 N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 253, 278 (1857)
(Nash, C.J., dissenting) (citing 9 Hen. 3, c. 36 (1225)).
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World War I, recalled “the enlightened and humane provision of
Magna Charta, c. 30 [1225]” on the subject of foreign merchants in
time of war.52 Judicial discussions of dower53 were often ornamented
with references to the relevant chapters of Magna Carta, including the
right of quarantine, the dowager’s right to occupy the mansion house
for forty days after her husband’s decease.54
II. WALTER CLARK AND MAGNA CARTA
A flurry of citations to Magna Carta is also associated with the
tenure of Walter Clark, who served on the Supreme Court of North
Carolina from 1889 to 1924, the last twenty-one years of which he
served as Chief Justice.55 Clark’s changing attitude toward the charter
exemplifies the tension that developed as historicist and legalist
approaches to Magna Carta diverged in the early twentieth century.56
In a 1905 personal injury action against a railroad, he repeated the
traditional view that “[t]he guaranty of the right of trial by jury is
traced back with pride to the words of Magna Charta, ‘Legale
judicium parium suorum.’ ”57 At this time, Clark was repeating
common legal lore in North Carolina.58 Judges before Clark routinely
described the constitutional right to trial by jury as a “fundamental
principle of the common law, declared in ‘Magna Charta.’ ”59 In fact,
52. Krachanake v. Acme Mfg. Co., 175 N.C. 435, 439, 95 S.E. 851, 853 (1918)
(referring to MAGNA CARTA ch. 30 (1225)).
53. Dower was available to surviving spouses until 1959. See Act of June 10, 1959, ch.
879, § 1, N.C. Sess. Laws 886, 886 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-4 (2015)) (“The
estates of curtesy and dower are hereby abolished.”).
54. E.g., In re Gorham, 177 N.C. 271, 277, 98 S.E. 717, 720 (1919); Fishel v. Browning,
145 N.C. 71, 75, 58 S.E. 759, 760 (1907); Sutton v. Askew, 66 N.C. 172, 181–82 (1872);
Griffin v. Simpson, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 126, 127 (1850); Spencer v. Weston, 18 N.C. (1 Dev.
& Bat.) 213, 214–15 (1835).
55. NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, 1585–1979: A NARRATIVE AND STATISTICAL
HISTORY 575–76 (John L. Cheney, Jr. ed., 1981).
56. See, e.g., Walter Clark, Some Myths of the Law, 13 MICH. L. REV. 26, 28–30 (1914)
(describing the “myth” of Magna Carta and explaining that it has been incorrectly used
and interpreted by some courts); Edward Jenks, The Myth of Magna Carta, 4 INDEP. REV.
260, 261–62 (1905) (arguing that “Magna Carta was not (a) the work of the ‘nation’ or the
‘people’ in any reasonable sense of the term, nor (b) a landmark in constitutional progress,
but (c) a positive nuisance and stumbling-block to the generation which came after it”).
57. Kearns v. S. Ry. Co., 139 N.C. 470, 482, 52 S.E. 131, 136 (1905) (Clark, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215)).
58. See Resolutions Adopted by the Provincial Congress of North Carolina (Aug. 27,
1774), supra note 24, at 1045.
59. State v. Stewart, 89 N.C. 563, 564 (1883); see also State v. Holt, 90 N.C. 749, 751
(1884) (“The people of the American Union, and especially the people of this state, have,
ever since their existence as a people, regarded and treated this provision in their organic
law as an essential feature in free government and as one of the fundamental bulwarks of
their civil and political liberty.”).
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the independence of the jury in North Carolina was guaranteed to an
extent that would have struck English judges as extreme. Trial judges
could make no comment concerning the probable guilt of the
defendant or the credibility of witnesses.60 As Justice Bynum stated in
an 1876 opinion, “The jury must not only unanimously concur in the
verdict, but must be left free to act according to the dictates of their
own judgment.”61 So sacrosanct was the jury’s freedom of action that
it was reversible error for a trial judge to say that two opposing
witnesses were both “gentlemen.”62 The jury had to be free to decide
without comment that one (or both) was not.63
After 1905, Clark’s attitude toward Magna Carta and jury trial
underwent a dramatic reversal. William Sharp McKechnie’s
Commentary on the Great Charter of King John appeared that year,64
and Clark was an early and avid reader.65 By the 1906 term of court,
Clark revealed his new attitude: “[W]e know,” he said, “that the
words ‘judicium parium suorum’ in Magna Charta, c. 39 [1215], did
not either create or guaranty the right of trial by jury (as at one time
was erroneously thought)”—including, although he did not mention
it, by Walter Clark.66 For authority, he cited “McKechnie, Magna
Charta, 452.”67 Later, in the 1913 case of State v. Rodgers,68 Clark
penned the most complete statement of his new understanding of the
great charter: “There have been law writers and judges who have
60. Act of 1796, ch. 452, § 1, reprinted in 1 N.C. REV. STAT. ch. 1, § 136 (1837) (codified
as amended in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1232 (2015)), prohibited judges from commenting on
evidence, but it had been held to be merely an “affirmance of the Constitution, Art. I secs.
13–17, and the well-settled principles of the common law as set forth in Magna Charta.” State
v. Dixon, 75 N.C. 275, 276 (1876). As Justice Douglas later observed, the construction placed
on the statute “goes beyond the words of the act, but it is accepted as a proper one.” State v.
Howard, 129 N.C. 584, 674–75, 40 S.E. 71, 80 (1901) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting State
v. Jones, 67 N.C. 285, 287 (1872)).
61. Dixon, 75 N.C. at 276.
62. MacRae v. Lawrence, 75 N.C. 289, 289–91 (1876).
63. Id.
64. WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT
CHARTER OF KING JOHN (1905). McKechnie’s book reached North Carolina lawyers
quickly. The copy in the collection of the Kathrine R. Everett Law Library of the University
of North Carolina is inscribed by L. P. McGehee and dated June 1905. At the time McGehee
was a newly hired law professor. He later served as dean of the University of North Carolina
School of Law (1910–1923). History, UNC SCH. L., http://www.law.unc.edu/about/history/
[https://perma.cc/Y3P6-CAK4].
65. See Daniels v. Homer, 139 N.C. 219, 238, 51 S.E. 992, 999 (1905) (Clark, C.J.)
(citing William Sharp McKechnie as “[t]he latest commentator on Magna Charta”).
66. Williams v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 140 N.C. 623, 626, 53 S.E. 448, 450 (1906),
overruled in part by Currie & McQueen v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 156 N.C. 419, 425–26,
72 S.E. 488, 490 (1911).
67. Id.
68. 162 N.C. 656, 78 S.E. 293 (1913).
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stated that Magna Carta, c. 39[, no longer Magna Charta in his
parlance,] guaranteed the right of trial by jury; but this view
originated at a time when historical statements were received with
less investigation than at present.”69 “The words therein ‘judicium
suorum parium,’ ” Clark now insisted, “had no reference to a trial by
jury,” again citing McKechnie (and adding Pollock and Maitland’s
The History of English Law for good measure).70 According to Clark,
the barons were not, in fact, demanding a general benefit but a
“special privilege” for themselves: “[W]hen the King had any charge
against one of their order he should not send his judges against them,
but the charge must be tried by men of their own order, i.e., by
barons.”71 Magna Carta and other similar charters now interested
Clark only as “historical documents of a stage far below ours in the
development of human rights.”72 The following year in the Michigan
Law Review, he listed then common understandings of Magna Carta
among the “myths of the law.”73
With characteristic feistiness, Clark—called by his biographer the
“fighting judge”74—continued to propagate the truth about “that
much misunderstood instrument, the Magna Carta of John.”75 No
longer idealized as the product of heroic barons, “sword in hand,”
defending English liberty against a tyrannical ruler,76 it now appeared
to Clark as merely a sordid deal between “brutal barons” and a
“contemptible king.”77 “[T]rial by jury was not provided for in Magna
Carta,” he flatly declared; in fact, he insisted, “at that time there were
neither juries nor lawyers in England.”78 Of course, the discontinuity
Clark perceived affected only the historian, not the jurist. He
remained as committed as ever to the right to trial by jury in North
Carolina, still understood as an independent panel of twelve acting
only by unanimity, but he no longer proudly traced the right back to

69. Id. at 662, 78 S.E. at 295 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. (citing MCKECHNIE, supra note 64, at 158, 456, 457; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra note 3, at 392, 581).
71. Id. at 663, 78 S.E. at 295.
72. Id. at 663, 78 S.E. at 296.
73. Clark, supra note 56, at 28.
74. See AUBREY LEE BROOKS, WALTER CLARK, FIGHTING JUDGE 81–84 (1944).
75. Jordan v. Simmons, 175 N.C. 537, 540, 95 S.E. 919, 920 (1918) (Clark, C.J.,
concurring).
76. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *127; THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 534
(Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1966).
77. Jordan, 175 N.C. at 540, 95 S.E. at 920.
78. In re Stone, 176 N.C. 336, 348, 97 S.E. 216, 222 (1918).
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the thirteenth century. Magna Carta, he observed, was not law in
North Carolina anyway.79
Clark’s judicial utterances on the subject punctuated his chief
justiceship, culminating in an American Law Review article he
published in 1924, the year of his death.80 “The object of this article,”
he wrote with the zeal of a convert,
is in the interest of truth to show that broad as are the
provisions of Magna Carta and great as has been its effect upon
the course of history, it has no claim however to be styled, as it
often has been, the origin and guarantee of trial by jury with
which it had nothing whatever to do.81
For leading lawyers astray, Clark blamed Coke and Blackstone,
particularly the latter.82 The greater part of the Commentaries, he
said, was “obsolete learning,” with “[m]uch of it [] incorrect at the
time it was written.”83 Regarding the persistence of the fallacy
concerning the jury, Clark attributed it to “a not unnatural tendency
of a later generation of lawyers to explain what was unfamiliar in the
great Charter by the surroundings of their own day.”84
But Clark’s campaign in the interest of truth did not succeed.
Once his commanding presence was removed from the court, the
justices quickly began to repair the rupture created by his revisionist
history. Clark’s bier had barely been removed from the capitol when
in 1925 Justice Clarkson, newly appointed to the court, quoted from
an 1883 opinion that predated Clark’s tenure: “It is a fundamental
principle of the common law, declared in ‘Magna Charta,’ [the h has
returned to the title,] and again in our Bill of Rights, that ‘no person
shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury

79. See State v. Rogers, 162 N.C. 656, 663, 78 S.E. 293, 296 (1913) (Clark, C.J.,
dissenting) (“Magna Carta and other similar contracts between [the king and the
barons] . . . confer no rights upon us, still less do they restrict our right to self-government.
We base our right to [trial by jury], not upon the grant of any King, but upon the inherent
power to govern ourselves . . . .”).
80. Walter Clark, Magna Carta and Trial by Jury, 58 AM. L. REV. 24 (1924).
81. Id. at 24.
82. For Clark’s unfavorable review of the influence of Coke and Blackstone, see
Walter Clark, Coke, Blackstone, and the Common Law, 24 LAW. MAG. 5, 15 (1918).
Clark’s complaint that “the influence of Blackstone and Coke has had a very narrowing
effect upon our Profession” elicited a spirited response from Samuel Fox Mordecai, Dean
of Trinity (now Duke) Law School. S.F. MORDECAI, MORDECAI’S MISCELLANIES 3
(1927).
83. Clark, supra note 80, at 37 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*60).
84. Id. at 31.
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of good and lawful men in open court.’ ”85 In 1937 Clarkson joined
issue with Clark (and McKechnie) on the Latin key words:
In Magna Charta the basic principle of [the right to trial by
jury] is more than once insisted on, as the great bulwark of
English liberties, but especially by the provision that “no
freeman shall be hurt, in either his person or property (nisi per
legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terrae), unless by
lawful judgment of his peers or equals, or by the law of the
land . . . .”86
By 1944, Justice Seawell would assert, despite Walter Clark’s best
efforts, that “most writers” regard “Magna Charta” as “guaranteeing
trial by jury.”87 And in 1971, Justice Sharp wrote that the right to a
trial by jury was a “fundamental principle of the common law,
declared in Magna Charta and incorporated in our Declaration of
Rights.”88 This view has persisted into the twenty-first century. In
2007 Justice Brady repeated that “[s]o fundamental to the
jurisprudence of the Anglosphere is the right to a trial by jury that it
is set forth in the Magna Carta . . . .”89
III. MAGNA CARTA IN NORTH CAROLINA TODAY
Whatever the precise relationship between legem terrae and trial
by jury, the guarantee of the law of the land has been more fertile for
state constitutional law than any other clause. Before the progressive
incorporation of the Federal Bill of Rights into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,90 the law of the land was the
85. State v. Berry, 190 N.C. 363, 363, 130 S.E. 12, 12 (1925) (Clarkson, J.) (quoting
State v. Stewart, 89 N.C. 563, 564 (1883)). A few years later, Clarkson quoted Justice
Joseph Story:
In Magna Carta the basic principle of [the right to trial by jury] is more than once
insisted on, as the great bulwark of English liberties, but especially by the
provision that “no freeman shall be hurt, in either his person or property, unless by
lawful judgment of his peers or equals, or by the law of the land.”
State v. Lawrence, 196 N.C. 562, 578, 146 S.E. 395, 403 (1929) (Clarkson, J.) (quoting 16
RULING CASE LAW § 3, at 182 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1917)).
86. Oliver v. City of Raleigh, 212 N.C. 465, 470, 193 S.E. 853, 856 (1937) (Clarkson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 16 RULING CASE LAW, supra note 85, § 3, at 182).
87. State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 595, 31 S.E.2d 858, 868 (1944) (Seawell, J.,
dissenting).
88. State v. Hudson, 280 N.C. 74, 79, 185 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1971) (Sharp, J.) (citing
State v. Stewart, 89 N.C. 563, 564 (1883)).
89. State v. Lasiter, 361 N.C. 299, 307, 643 S.E.2d 909, 914 (2007) (Brady, J.,
concurring).
90. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment Assistance of Counsel Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
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focus for judicial thinking about fundamental fairness.91 Magna Carta
gave it a distinguished provenance. Even before the addition of the
open courts clause to the Constitution in 1868, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, citing Magna Carta, found the right to a remedy
implied in the law of the land.92 Despite the fact that the state
constitution has no takings clause, the court in 1892 located the
protection against uncompensated takings in the law of the land,
again citing Magna Carta.93 And the guarantee against double
jeopardy, also lacking specific mention in the state constitution, was
found in 1907 in “the fundamental principles of the common law” and
“Magna Charta.”94
After incorporation made most of the Federal Bill of Rights
enforceable against the states, the law of the land clause became
relatively less important. But, the state supreme court continued to
insist on it as an independent basis for decision, a legacy of the once
lively project of expansive readings of state constitutions.95 In 1971,
two years after the United States Supreme Court incorporated the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment into the Fourteenth
Amendment,96 the state supreme court insisted that the decision
“added nothing to our law,” which already prohibited double
jeopardy as a violation of the law of the land.97 Today the Supreme
Court of North Carolina sometimes actually skips the middle term
and simply asserts—most recently in 2014—that there is a double
jeopardy clause in the state constitution.98
Process Clause); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule
of the Fourth Amendment to state criminal prosecutions by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause). See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986)
(discussing the history of the Bill of Rights and its application to the states).
91. See, e.g., Parish v. E. Coast Cedar Co., 133 N.C. 478, 483, 45 S.E. 768, 770 (1903)
(“We refer to the federal Constitution only by way of analogy, as we base our decision in
the case at bar exclusively upon the provisions of the Constitution of this state.”).
92. Barnes v. Barnes, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 366, 374 (1861) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 11, at *141).
93. Staton v. Norfolk & C. R. Co., 111 N.C. 278, 282–85, 16 S.E. 181, 182–83 (1892);
see also Yancey v. N.C. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm’n, 222 N.C. 106, 108, 22
S.E.2d 256, 258 (1942) (citing MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215)).
94. State v. Tisdale, 145 N.C. 422, 426, 58 S.E. 998, 1000 (1907) (Walker, J.,
concurring).
95. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 498–503 (1977) (advocating reliance on state constitutional
protections).
96. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
97. State v. Battle, 279 N.C. 484, 486, 183 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1971).
98. E.g., State v. Banks, 367 N.C. 652, 655, 766 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2014) (quoting State v.
Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 452, 342 S.E.2d 701, 707 (1986)) (referring to the “Double
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The open courts clause, like the law of the land clause, traces its
pedigree to Magna Carta. While the phrase “open courts” is not to be
found in the original charter, it accurately captures the sense of
chapter forty (1215): “To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny
or delay, right or justice”; that is, the courts shall be open to do
justice.99 As a practical matter, the open courts clause in the state
constitution functioned as a guarantee of speedy trial at a time when
the federal guarantee in the Sixth Amendment did not extend to the
states.100 In this case, Walter Clark was still proud to trace the
guarantee to the words of Magna Carta. While continuing to insist
that “modern research has demonstrated that we do not owe trial by
jury to Magna Charta, and that it originated years after,” he remained
committed to the tie between the historic charter and speedy trial:
“One of the pledges of Magna Carta was that ‘justice should not be
delayed.’ ”101 In a per curiam opinion that bears the marks of Clark’s
style, the court held that
[w]hile Magna Charta did not originate, or require, trial by jury,
as at one time thought, it is very certain that it did guarantee
that there should be a prompt administration of justice by
providing (chapter 47) that the courts will neither sell justice,
nor deny it, nor delay it, and a delay of justice is often a denial
of justice.102
Had Clark read McKechnie’s commentary on chapter forty as
closely as he read the commentary on chapter thirty-nine, he might

Jeopardy Clauses of both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions”). But see
State v. Rambert, 341 N.C. 173, 175 n.1, 459 S.E.2d 510, 512 n.1 (1995) (citing State v.
Ballard, 280 N.C. 479, 482, 186 S.E.2d 372, 373 (1972)) (acknowledging that the state
constitution does not in fact have a double jeopardy clause but noting that the same
protection is implied in the law of the land clause).
99. MAGNA CARTA ch. 40 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note
12, at 52–53; cf. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18 (“All courts shall be open; every person for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course
of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay.”); id. art.
IV, § 9(2) (“The Superior Courts shall be open at all times for the transaction of all
business except the trial of issues of fact requiring a jury.”).
100. E.g., Pettitt v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 186 N.C. 9, 16–17, 118 S.E. 840, 844–45
(1923) (Clark, C.J.); Slocumb v. Phila. Const. Co., 142 N.C. 349, 352, 55 S.E. 196, 197
(1906) (Clark, C.J); Johnston v. Whitehead, 109 N.C. 207, 209, 13 S.E. 731, 731 (1891)
(Clark, J.).
101. Davis v. S. Ry. Co., 170 N.C. 582, 599, 600, 87 S.E. 745, 753, 754 (1916) (Clark,
C.J., dissenting).
102. Rose v. City of Rocky Mount, 184 N.C. 609, 610, 113 S.E. 506, 507 (1922) (per
curiam). Chapter forty-seven in “Magna Carta of King John” as cited and reprinted in 2
N.C. REV. STAT. 486 (1837) is chapter forty in the conventional division of MAGNA
CARTA (1215).
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not have been so certain. “This chapter,” McKechnie wrote, “like the
preceding one with which it is so closely connected, has had much
read into it by commentators which would have astonished its original
framers. The application of modern standards to ancient practice has
resulted in a complete misapprehension.”103 McKechnie explained the
chapter as chiefly concerned with the sale of justice and attributed
the prominence usually given to it in legal treatises . . . to the
fact that it has been broadly interpreted as a universal
guarantee of impartial justice to high and low; and because
when so interpreted it has become in the hands of patriots in
many ages a powerful weapon in the cause of constitutional
freedom.104
McKechnie barely mentioned delay of justice, and then only in
connection with payments to speed the legal process.
The tendency of lawyers and judges to understand the medieval
words of Magna Carta in a modern sense was demonstrated afresh in
1976 when the state supreme court held that the open courts clause
guarantees public access to courtroom proceedings.105 The guarantee
of legal remedies for legal wrongs thus became a guarantee of public,
as well as speedy, trials. Having once created the right to public trials,
the court has, of course, had to qualify it with exceptions.106
CONCLUSION
Anachronistic readings are perhaps inevitable in a tradition that
looks to the past for guidance in the present. Clark may well be right
that Coke and Blackstone misled their readers about the real
meaning of Magna Carta, but the drafters of the state constitution
were convinced and incorporated that meaning into the text. As no
less a personage than Henry Kissinger reminded us: “[W]hat ‘really’
happened is often less important than what is thought to have
happened.”107 So firmly settled was state law by 1905 that Clark could
103. MCKECHNIE, supra note 64, at 459.
104. Id. at 463.
105. In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 306, 226 S.E.2d 5, 9–10 (1976).
106. See, e.g., Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 474–78, 515
S.E.2d 675, 691–94 (1999) (excluding the public during presentation of evidence regarding
medical peer review investigation); State v. Clark, 324 N.C. 146, 167, 377 S.E.2d 54, 66–67
(1989) (excluding spectators that would distract the jury); State v. Burney, 302 N.C. 529,
533–38, 276 S.E.2d 693, 695–98 (1981) (excluding the public during testimony of a child
rape victim).
107. Niall Ferguson, The Meaning of Kissinger: A Realist Reconsidered, 94 FOREIGN
AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2015, at 134, 137 (quoting HENRY A. KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED:
METTERNICH, CASTLEREAGH AND THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 1812–22, at 33 (1957)).
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adopt the latest historical thinking without jeopardizing North
Carolinians’ right to trial by jury. McKechnie was writing history, not
law, but he did recognize that revisionist scholarship like his may
“undervalue[] the importance of traditional interpretations which,
even when based on insecure historical foundations, are shown in the
sequel to have proved of supreme value in the battle of freedom.”108
The Great Charter was one of the inspirations for written
constitutions, intended to restrain the exercise of power. The great
irony is that it empowered judges to use the text as precedent for
judicial elaboration. The words—as so often in the common law—
were not the end of the process, but only the beginning. A text may
mean, or imply, or be made to mean more than it says.109 Once the
process has begun, the tendency is not to start with the words but with
the last, or the last few, cases that construed them. One is almost
tempted to say that it is not text, but texture that matters most.110 Just
as Sir Edward Coke found new meanings in old documents, so
modern jurists continue the search. One need only consider the recent
same-sex marriage decision to see how far determined jurists can take
due process or the law of the land or legem terrae.111
Revisionism has a way of turning upon itself. Robert Brady had
an agenda, the opposite of Coke’s.112 And even critics acting only in
the interest of truth cannot attain certainty. As Professor J. C. Holt
reminded us in his magisterial study of the Great Charter, Coke’s
history is “not quite so insecure as . . . the modern critics would
suggest.”113 It is, he said, “to pursue a will-o’-the-wisp” to assume that
“the exact contemporary sense of Magna Carta can be established as
a canon whereby Coke and all other ‘false’ interpreters can be

108. MCKECHNIE, supra note 64, at ix (commenting on Jenks, supra note 56).
109. An example from federal constitutional law is the judicial elaboration of the
Eleventh Amendment. See generally JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987).
110. Cf. VLADIMIR NABOKOV, Canto III, in PALE FIRE (1962) (“But all at once it
dawned on me that this / Was the real point, the contrapuntal theme; / Just this: not text,
but texture; not the dream / But topsy-turvical coincidence, / Not flimsy nonsense, but a
web of sense.”). I am indebted to Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, State of
North Carolina, for directing me to these lines.
111. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–2605 (2015).
112. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 8, at 22, 25 (stating that Brady “made a full-scale attack
on the view of history which the common lawyers had developed . . . [but] Brady carried
his historical revision too far . . . .”).
113. HOLT, supra note 8, at 36.
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judged.”114 It is not only the future that year by year recedes before
us; it is also the past.
Magna Carta is an historical artifact, and it is not. Or rather,
there are two historical artifacts: what it meant in 1215 and its
evolving meaning over time. History is the story of both stasis and
change. The divergence of the two stories must be recognized, but
need not cause alarm. As any property lawyer can testify, there are
few titles in our law that are wholly unclouded, and the root of many
of them is doubtful—based, you might say, on “insecure historical
foundations”—but long continued enjoyment under a claim of right
(i.e., adverse possession) clears away most clouds.

114. Id.; see also CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT
AND ITS SUPREMACY: AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN
LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION IN ENGLAND 16 (1962) (positing that Magna Carta
stood for “a subtraction from the royal power” and subsequently “formed the most
valuable precedent for the later exercise of national rights”).

